As a presidential candidate, Sen. Obama was firmly convinced (and convinced a lot of people) that the reason for America’s unpopularity in some parts of the world was George W. Bush and his conservative policies. A vote for Obama, we were assured, would make the world like America again.
Roughly eleven months on from his inauguration, the bloom is well and truly off that rose, at least in the Arab/Muslim world.
He has not made the world anew, history did not bend to his will, the Indians and Pakistanis have been told that the matter of Kashmir is theirs to resolve, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the same intractable clash of two irreconcilable nationalisms, and the theocrats in Iran have not “unclenched their fist,” nor have they abandoned their nuclear quest.
There is little Mr. Obama can do about this disenchantment. He can’t journey to Turkey to tell its Islamist leaders and political class that a decade of anti-American scapegoating is all forgiven and was the product of American policies—he has already done that. He can’t journey to Cairo to tell the fabled “Arab street” that the Iraq war was a wasted war of choice, and that America earned the malice that came its way from Arab lands—he has already done that as well. He can’t tell Muslims that America is not at war with Islam—he, like his predecessor, has said that time and again. . . .
In the Palestinian territories, 15% have a favorable view of the U.S. while 82% have an unfavorable view. The Obama speech in Ankara didn’t seem to help in Turkey, where the favorables are 14% and those unreconciled, 69%. In Egypt, a country that’s reaped nearly 40 years of American aid, things stayed roughly the same: 27% have a favorable view of the U.S. while 70% do not. In Pakistan, a place of great consequence for American power, our standing has deteriorated: The unfavorables rose from 63% in 2008 to 68% this year.
There are various reasons for this. One, which Fouad Ajami notes, is that anti-Americanism in that part of the world is useful—perhaps, indeed, psychologically necessary—as an alibi for the political and economic failures of those nations and a pressure release for the tensions and frustrations created by their autocratic, self-interested governments; having someone to blame for all that is far too valuable to be let go in return for a few pretty speeches.
As well, Ajami explains, the President’s confidence that he could make everything better by apologizing for America to everyone in sight betrayed a fundamental failure to understand Arab culture.
Steeped in an overarching idea of American guilt, Mr. Obama and his lieutenants offered nothing less than a doctrine, and a policy, of American penance. No one told Mr. Obama that the Islamic world, where American power is engaged and so dangerously exposed, it is considered bad form, nay a great moral lapse, to speak ill of one’s own tribe when in the midst, and in the lands, of others.
The crowd may have applauded the cavalier way the new steward of American power referred to his predecessor, but in the privacy of their own language they doubtless wondered about his character and his fidelity. “My brother and I against my cousin, my cousin and I against the stranger,” goes one of the Arab world’s most honored maxims. The stranger who came into their midst and spoke badly of his own was destined to become an object of suspicion.
It also didn’t help that in Iran, when the President was offered the choice between standing with the Iranian people protesting their oppression or standing with the anti-American religious tyrants who oppress them, he chose the tyrants. That, one suspects, will not be soon forgotten, and it’s impossible to know what the long-term effects might be.
Some might be surprised that President Obama’s approach to foreign policy is not yielding the promised results; but students of history shouldn’t be. How many horror movies do you have to watch before you learn to expect that the pretty cheerleader going alone into the dark house on a stormy night is going to end up dead? I don’t even watch horror movies, and I can see that one coming. This administration’s foreign policy is just a remake of a movie we’ve seen before; it debuted roughly 33 years ago, it was called Carter, and as Bret Stephens pointed out a couple weeks ago, it didn’t end well then, either.
An idealistic president takes office promising an era of American moral renewal at home and abroad. The effort includes a focus on diplomacy and peace-making, an aversion to the use of force, the selling out of old allies. The result is that within a couple of years the U.S. is more suspected, detested and enfeebled than ever.
No, we’re not talking about Barack Obama. But since the current administration took office offering roughly the same prescriptions as Jimmy Carter did, it’s worth recalling how that worked out.
Stephens explicates this through an examination of the 1979 battle over the Grand Mosque in Mecca, an incident remembered little (if at all) in this country, and its aftermath—an aftermath we’re still dealing with today.
Among Muslims inclined to favor the U.S., the Carter administration’s instincts for knee-jerk conciliation and panicky withdrawals only had the effect of alienating them from their ostensible protector. Coming as it did so soon after Khomeini’s rise to power and the revolutionary fervors which it unleashed, the siege of Mecca carried the real risk of undermining pro-American regimes throughout the region. Yet American embassies were repeatedly instructed not to use their Marines to defend against intruders, as well as to pull their personnel from the country.
“The move didn’t go unnoticed among Muslim radicals,” notes Mr. Trofimov. “A chain of events unleashed by the takeover in Mecca had put America on the run from the lands of Islam. America’s foes drew a conclusion that Osama bin Laden would often repeat: when hit hard, America flees, ‘dragging its tail in failure, defeat, and ruin, caring for nothing.'” It is no accident, too, that the Soviet Union chose to invade Afghanistan the following month, as it observed a vacillating president who would not defend what previously were thought to be inviolable U.S. strategic interests.
Here’s hoping that if and when America faces another such incident in the Muslim world, that the administration has the courage, will and wit to react in defense of American interests and allies, rather than to follow the Carter path of trying to be as inoffensive as possible. I am not, however, optimistic.
…still waiting for what the 'right' approach would be. Dubya's foreign policy is a hard sell as a success by any but a neo-conservative measure. So Obama has failed to fix everything in less than a year (still a ludicrous standard to enforce on any president, but it seems to be what conservatives love doing right now). So what's the answer? Yee-haw cowboy swagger didn't work, and apologizing for things we did wrong isn't your cup of tea. Should we have more of Reagan's proxy-wars and propping up totalitarian regimes (including the Taliban and Saddam Hussein I must note)? Would you hold up Bush I or Clinton as successful? What's the right choice?
It hasn't even been a year – how would you fix everything, if what Obama is don't isn't up to snuff?
It's not that "Obama has failed to fix everything in less than a year"; it's that he hasn't improved anything. If things were moving in a positive direction, that would be a different matter–but they aren't.
Also, I would note that a lot of the things President Obama's doing that aren't working are direct continuations of the previous administration's foreign policy. For all your reflexive denunciations of the younger President Bush, his foreign policy in much of the world really didn't match your rhetoric.